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I. INTRODUCTION
Communication contributes to the marketplace of
ideasI which is the only way to promote the discovery of
1. Justice Holmes introduced the "marketplace of ideas" notion in his famous dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). His premise, which has become a major justifica-
tion for free speech, stated:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
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truth in society. 2 The importance of communication has led the
United States Supreme Court to herald freedom of expression as "the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom." Indeed, the Court protects few other constitutional rights
with such fervor. First Amendment protection is not absolute,4
however, and the United States Supreme Court consistently has
asserted that certain forms or classes of expression may be regulated
without violating the Constitution. Generally speaking, the Court has
carved exceptions to First Amendment protection when the expression
makes no contribution to the marketplace of ideas.5 One such class of
unprotected speech is fighting words. 6 Unfortunately, the Court has
experienced great difficulty distinguishing fighting words from merely
offensive ideas that clearly are entitled to the highest level of First
Amendment protection.
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also David F. McGowan and Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertar-
ian Critique of University Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 825, 834 (1991)
(discussing the marketplace of ideas theory). The Court's reliance on the marketplace concept ap-
pears in numerous opinions. See, for example, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339
(1974) (stating that "there is no such thing as a false idea"); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that a classroom is a marketplace of ideas); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (stating that the free flow of ideas in the marketplace is
fundamentally important); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (asserting that a
national commitment exists to the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate of significant
issues); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (stating that the government must
adopt a neutral position in the marketplace of ideas).
2. Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 Rutgers L. Rev.
287, 289 (1990); Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 647, 671. Pro-
fessor Greenawalt discusses numerous other justifications for free speech, labeling them as
.consequentialist" and "non-consequentialist." He first describes various consequentialist
reasons-those justifications that concern the effects of free speech. For example, free speech
helps society discover truths, accommodate competing individual interests, expose and deter
abuses of authority, promote autonomy, and teach tolerance for differences. Greenawalt, 42
Rutgers L. Rev. at 289; Greenawalt, 1980 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. at 671-72. Non-consequentialist
reasoning does not examine the effects of a practice; instead, it considers the denial of a liberty as
a wrong. The restriction of speech is an injustice that denies citizens their autonomy and dignity.
Greenawalt, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. at 289; Greenawalt, 1980 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. at 673-75.
3. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
4. See, for example, Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (rejecting the
idea that First and Fourteenth Amendment protection of free speech and association is absolute);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (stating that freedom of speech is not absolute).
5. For example, maliciously false information generally is not protected because the
expression does not lead to the discovery of truth. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For other exceptions, see Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (allowing regulation of obscenity); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982) (permitting regulation of child pornography); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(199 1) (allowing regulation of nude dancing).
6. The Court first introduced the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942), defining the speech as words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 572.
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The Supreme Court first articulated the fighting words excep-
tion in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire7 but to date has not upheld
another law based on the doctrine. Moreover, the exception has
caused much debate in recent years because of the increased public
focus on hate speech and other bias-motivated concerns. Studies
reflect an escalation of hate-motivated violence in society." In
response to the increased turmoil, educational institutions and
legislatures have passed numerous hate speech codes criminalizing
bias-motivated activities.9 Many of these laws are based on the
fighting words exception, 1° even though the fighting words doctrine
7. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
8. In the United States, the frequency of hate crimes increased approximately 24.4% from
1991 to 1992. Andrea L. Crowley, Note, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: How the Supreme Court
Missed the Writing on the Wall, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 771, 771 (1993) (citing Leading Law Firm Releases
First National Law Enforcement Survey for 1992 Revealing Significant Increases in Hate Crimes,
P.R. Newswire Ass'n (Jan. 14, 1993) (available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PRNEWS file)).
According to the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, approximately 250 colleges
experienced incidents of racism between 1986 and 1989. Connie Leslie, Lessons from Bigotry 101,
Newsweek 48, 49 (Sept. 25. 1989). See also State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. 1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (documenting the increase in bias-motivated crime over the last
century); Charles R. Lawrence I, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 Duke L. J. 431, 431-44 (describing various incidents of racial violence on college
campuses); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2326-33 (1989) (outlining numerous incidents of racially biased hate speech).
One commentator recently asserted that the United States may be "no closer today in our efforts
to quell the tide of racism and inequality than we were nearly twenty-five years ago when the
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. dreamt so fervently of a nation free for all humanity." Victoria
L. Handler, Legislating Social Tolerance: Hate Crimes and the First Amendment, 13 Hamline J.
Pub. L. & Pol. 137, 137 (1992).
9. See, for example, Cal. Penal Code § 422.6 (West 1988); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-58
(West 1986); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 37 (West 1993); W. Va. Code § 61-6-21 (1988).
Congress addressed the problem of bias-motivated crime by enacting the Hate Crimes Statistics
Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. 1992) to create a national data collection system to study and
document these crimes but has not enacted any direct restrictions of hate speech. For praises of
hate speech regulations, see generally Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. 431; Matsuda, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
2320; Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-
Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982). For arguments against hate speech censorship,
see generally Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
Duke L, J. 484; Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech
in America (Oxford U., 1986); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression
and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 95.
10. For example, Stanford University adopted a hate speech regulation in June, 1990 based
on the fighting words exception. The applicable section of the regulation reads:
Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment
4. Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if it:
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small
number of individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic
origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it
insults or stigmatizes; and
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has confused courts and led to inconsistent judicial opinions.
Moreover, the Court's recent attempt to clarify the exception in R.A. V.
v. City of St. Paul', only further muddled the unsettled construct.
R.A.V., a Minnesota teenager, was charged with disorderly
conduct after allegedly burning a cross in an African-American fam-
ily's yard.12 He challenged the constitutionality of the relevant St.
Paul ordinance, claiming that the law was impermissibly content-
based and overbroad."- The Supreme Court unanimously ruled the
ordinance unconstitutional, yet the majority and concurring Justices'
opinions contrast dramatically and contain inconsistent, infeasible
approaches to the fighting words exception. If read narrowly,
however, Justice White's concurrence implies a version of the doctrine
that, if refined, creates a logical, coherent exception to expression
protected by the First Amendment.
This Recent Development examines the history of the fighting
words concept and explores the possible effects of the R.A.V. decision
on the doctrine. Part II discusses the Court's narrowing of the excep-
tion and the confusing, inconsistent standards that have developed
under the guise of fighting words. Part III outlines the Justices'
opinions in R.A.V. Part IV examines the two opposing fighting words
constructs in R.A.V. and the possible implications of the Justices'
opinions. Considering the concerns raised by both doctrinal defini-
tions, Parts IV and V recommend a version of the fighting words ex-
ception implicit in Justice White's concurrence that arguably could
resolve the long-standing confusion surrounding the ambiguous doc-
trine.
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal
symbols.
In the context of discriminatory harassment by personal vilification, insulting or
"fighting" words or non-verbal symbols are those "which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace," and which are commonly
understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the ba-
sis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic
origin.
Lawrence, 1990 Duke L. J. at 450-51 (cited in note 8). For a favorable discussion of the Stanford
regulation see id. at 431. But see Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at 507-14 (criticizing the use of the
fighting words doctrine in hate speech regulations).
11. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
12. Id. at 2541. R.A.v. was charged with violating St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance, St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990). For the language of the ordinance, see note
86.




A. The Origin of the Doctrine: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
The Supreme Court first formulated the fighting words doc-
trine in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.14  Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's
Witness, made several statements denouncing organized religion
while distributing religious literature on a public street.15 A police
officer led Chaplinsky toward the city police station to protect him
from nearby listeners who reacted violently to the derogatory com-
ments. En route to the station, Chaplinsky met a city marshall who
previously had cautioned him about the restless crowd.16 Chaplinsky
called the officer several degrading names and denounced all city
government officials as fascists.17 In response to Chaplinsky's state-
ments to the officer, the state charged Chaplinsky under a New
Hampshire statute that prohibited the use of offensive, insulting lan-
guage toward persons in public places, s The United States Supreme
Court upheld the statute as constitutional, basing its decision on the
state court's narrow construction of the offensive speech statute. 9
According to the New Hampshire court, the statute forbade only those
words having a direct tendency to cause violent reactions by persons
to whom the speech was addressed.20 Therefore, the Court measured
the likelihood of a violent reaction objectively and considered what
language would be likely to cause an average person to fight.21
The Court intended its opinion in Chaplinsky to be narrow.22
The Court's dicta, however, created the fighting words doctrine:
14. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
15. Chaplinsky allegedly called organized religion a "racket." Id. at 570.
16. Id.
17. Chaplinsky called the officer a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist," further
stating that "the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists." Id. at 569.
18. The entire statute, Chapter 378, § 2 of the Public Laws of New Hampshire, as set forth
in Chaplinsky, provided that "[n]o person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word
to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with
intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or
occupation." Id. at 569.
19. Id. at 573.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Freedom of Expression, 33 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 37, 53 (1976) (quoting Justice Jackson's statement in regard to Chaplinsky that "[tihe
Constitution does not include a right to brawl and that's about all that seems to be involved").
Justice Black stated that he joined the Chaplinsky opinion only because it was a case in which
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There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very ut-
terance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any ex-
position of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social in-
terest in order and morality.2 3
This vague passage has created much confusion and uncer-
tainty about the substantive content and rationale behind the fighting
words doctrine.24 Commentators have construed two possible defini-
tions for fighting words from the Court's dicta: (1) words "which by
their very utterance inflict injury,"2 5 and (2) speech that "tend[s] to
incite an immediate breach of the peace."26 The Supreme Court has
not upheld any speech restrictions under the injury prong of the fight-
ing words construct; the Court also has not clarified the type of injury
required by the doctrine.2 7  Instead, its subsequent decisions have
speech was merely a part of regulable conduct. Id. See also Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as
Free Speech, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. 531, 534 (1980) (asserting that the expansive Chaplinsky dicta was
not intended to have any doctrinal significance).
23. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
24. Compare, for example, Thomas F. Shea, "Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me
That"--Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L. J. 1, 9 (1975) (stating that fighting
words are not protected because they are a "medium of something approaching a physical
assault"), and Ernest A. Young, Recent Development, Regulation of Racist Speech: In Re Welfare
of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 903, 910-11 (1991) (quoting
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-8 at 837 (Foundation, 2d ed. 1988))
(concluding that no constitutional right exists to use words as "projectiles" because the 'blow"
usually preempts any further exchange of ideas), with Fran-Linda Kobel, Comment, The Fighting
Words Doctrine-Is There a Clear and Present Danger to the Standard?, 84 Dickinson L. Rev. 75,
80 n.32 (1979) (arguing that Shea's distinction is "mere fiction" and that Chaplinsky classified
particular speech as nonspeech). See also Gard, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. at 534 (cited in note 22)
(discussing other possible rationales for censoring fighting words).
25. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
26. Id. Furthermore, the Chaplinsky Court's focus on "the social interest in order and
morality" reflects a governmental interest in promoting civility. Note, The Demise of the Chaplin-
sky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its Interment, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1129, 1131
(1993). See also Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited Hate Group Speech and the First
Amendment, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 629, 632 (1985); Hadley Arkes, The Philosopher in the City:
The Moral Dimensions of Urban Politics 56-91 (Princeton U., 1981). Because the Chaplinsky
Court was motivated by this interest, one commentator suggests that the Court understood the
"breach of the peace" prong in terms of expression tending to disrupt general tranquility, not as a
narrow exception for words likely to cause retaliatory violence. See Note, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at
1131.
27. Handler, 13 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol. at 147 (cited in note 8). Consequently, many
commentators believe that the injury prong has been de facto overruled. See, for example,
Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at 509 (cited in note 9); Note, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 1137-40. But see
Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1974) (proposing that the injury prong addresses the harm inflicted on
the emotions and sensibilities of listeners).
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focused narrowly on a statement's perceived propensity to cause a
violent reaction by an individual addressed by the speech.28
Nevertheless, the Court has not rejected the injury prong explicitly,
leaving the justification viable for use in future judicial decisions.2 9
B. Narrowing the Doctrine's Scope and Increasing Its Confusion
Seven years after establishing the fighting words exception,
the Court reaffirmed the doctrine's existence in Terminiello v. Chi-
cagoA0 The Court, however, immediately began narrowing and re-
shaping the broad scope of the Chaplinsky dicta. Terminiello was
charged with breaching the peace after he publicly insulted a group of
adversaries.31 The Court did not address whether Terminiello's actual
statements were fighting words.32 Instead, the Court found that the
applicable breach-of-the-peace statute was overbroad33 because the
law permitted convictions for both fighting words and constitutionally
protected expression.3 4 Speech that merely causes anger or outrage is
not considered fighting words. In fact, creating disputes is a valuable
function of free speech; expression serves its purpose best in the
marketplace of ideas when it creates unrest or anger in individuals.35
28. See generally Part ll.B.
29. Various Justices and scholars have advocated using the injury prong of the fighting
words doctrine. See, for example, Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-10 at 856 (cited in
note 24) (asserting that the Constitution may allow punishment for speech that hurts by being ut-
tered and heard); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 906 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(stating that "a verbal assault on an unwilling audience may be so grossly offensive and emo-
tionally disturbing as to be the proper subject of criminal proscription").
30. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
31. When making a vicious speech denouncing Jewish and African-American persons,
Terminiello referred to a mob of protestors as "slimy scum,* "snakes," and "atheistic communistic
Jew[s]." Id. at 17-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
32. Perhaps Terminiello represents the Court's early attempt to avoid applying the fighting
words doctrine and to lessen any restrictions on political speech. Handler, 13 Hamline J. Pub. L.
& Pol. at 148 (cited in note 8).
33. The overbreadth doctrine is a major principle in First Amendment jurisprudence. It
posits that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967) (quoting
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). A statute is overbroad if (1) the speech affected by
the law substantially involves expression that is protected by the First Amendment, Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972), and (2) the overbreadth is "real [and] substantial ... judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973).
34. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5. The trial court defined the statute to encompass speech that
.stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a distur-
bance ..... Id. at 4.
35. The Court's assertion, repeatedly noted as a justification for free speech, stated that "a
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best
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Therefore, the Court found that speech is protected unless the expres-
sion is likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious, intol-
erable evil that rises above mere inconvenience or annoyance. 36 By
requiring more than anger or unrest, the Court emphasized that it
would not assume that certain words inevitably provoke violent
reactions by individuals. Instead, the Court considered the likelihood
of an uncontrollable reaction to be a factual inquiry that relies on the
circumstances surrounding the use of the language.37 The analysis
scrutinized the context in which the words were used, not just the
content of the words themselves.
Twenty years after Terminiello, the Court reaffirmed the
viability of the fighting words doctrine in Street v. New York. 38 Street
was convicted of a malicious misdemeanor after burning an American
flag to protest the shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith. 39
During the burning, Street made a defiant comment about the flag.4o
The Supreme Court reversed Street's conviction because his words, a
possible factor in his conviction, were protected by the First
Amendment.41 Street's statement did not constitute fighting words
because it was not directed to incite a violent response by any
individual.4 Moreover, the Court re-emphasized that the mere
offensiveness of words does not strip speech of constitutional protec-
tion . 3 Fighting words must present an actual immediacy of violent
confrontation, not just offensive content.
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi-
tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Id. This emphasis on the free exchange of ideas
clearly reflects the Holmesian marketplace of ideas notion. See note 1.
36. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
37. Gard, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. at 551 (cited in note 22). This approach contradicts the
Chaplinsky notion that offensiveness of speech equals a violent reaction. See Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 12-10 at 850 (cited in note 24) (asserting that Chaplinsky focused primarily
on the content of speech, not the context); Kobel, Comment, 84 Dickinson L. Rev. at 79-80 (cited in
note 24) (stating that Chaplinsky stressed the content of fighting words over the likelihood of a
violent reaction).
38. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
39. Id. at 578-79. The statute under which Street was convicted, New York Penal Law §
1425, made it a misdemeanor to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast
contempt upon either by words or act [any flag of the United States]." Id. at 577-78.
40. Street asserted, "We don't need no damn flag." Id. at 579.
41. Id. at 589-91.
42. Id. at 592. Moreover, in a recent flag-burning case, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989), the Court held that burning an American flag was not fighting words under the cir-
cumstances of the case because the act neither directly insulted an individual nor invited a fight.
Id. at 409.
43. Street, 394 U.S. at 592 (stating, "[S]uch a conviction could not be sustained on the
ground that appellant's words were likely to shock passers-by.... It is firmly settled that under
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas
are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."). This statement demonstrates the Court's re-
finement of the Chaplinsky injury prong: offending or shocking an individual is not a sufficient
1150
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Although Terminiello and Street held that offensive, disturbing
speech warrants protection, the Court expanded its constitutional
tolerance of this expression in Cohen v. California." Cohen was
arrested and convicted for disturbing the peace after wearing a jacket
that bore the words "Fuck the Draft" in a county courthouse corridor.45
The Supreme Court, concluding that Cohen's expression did not con-
stitute fighting words, continued to revise the Chaplinsky fighting
words model radically.4 Even though Cohen's jacket displayed termi-
nology often used in a "personally provocative manner,"47 Cohen's
statement was not a direct insult toward any individual in the court-
house and 6onsequently could not be regulated as fighting words.48 In
fact, the Court effectively limited the fighting words exception to face-
to-face personal insults49 by requiring a speaker to arouse an actual
injury to deny constitutional protection to speech. See also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (stating that
"[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable").
44. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
45. Id. at 16. Cohen was convicted under the portion of California Penal Code § 415 that
stated:
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any neigh-
borhood or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or
threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight, or fighting, or who, on the public
streets of any unincorporated town... use[s] any vulgar, profane, or indecent language
within the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 16 n.1
46. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-10 at 851-52 (cited in note 24). The Cohen
opinion seemingly reflected the Court's continually changing views of the First Amendment. See
Richard D. Bernstein, Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to
Inflict Emotional Distress, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1757 (1985) (stating that nothing since the
origin of the fighting words doctrine has made profanity or insults more related to the exposition
of ideas; tolerance for these forms of speech is caused by the Court's changed perception of the
First Amendment).
47. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
48. The prosecution introduced no evidence at Cohen's trial that anyone who saw Cohen'sjacket in the courthouse was violently aroused or that Cohen intended to create such a violent re-
sult. Id.
49. Mark A. Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler's Veto?, 28 DePaul L.
Rev. 259, 266 (1979). Many commentators have asserted that by focusing on the context of words,
the Court has shifted the fighting words standard away from the Chaplinsky objective criteria of
'what would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight." These scholars believe that
the modern fighting words doctrine embodies a subjective standard requiring a clear and present
danger of a violent reaction by the actual addressee of the offensive speech. See Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 12-8 at 838 (cited in note 24); Kobel, Comment, 84 Dickinson L. Rev. at 88
(cited in note 24); Rabinowitz, 28 DePaul L. Rev. at 266. But see Gard, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. at 554-
56 (cited in note 22) (arguing that the Court has not abandoned the Chaplinsky objective "average
addressee" standard); Michael J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 Colum. L.
Rev. 1527, 1544 (1993) (proposing that the Court has developed a two-part test-an objective
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violent reaction or intend to provoke such a reaction by the offended
addressee.6°
The Court continued to adhere to a narrow, context-based
fighting words doctrine in Gooding v. Wilson.51 Wilson was convicted
under an abusive language statute2 after he threatened and insulted
two police officers.5 The Court declared the Georgia statute unconsti-
tutionally overbroad because the law condemned both protected and
unprotected speech.54  Looking at the dictionary definitions of the
statute's terminology, the Court held that the statute's adjectives
"opprobrious" and "abusive" reached beyond the scope of fighting
words.55 In reaching its conclusion, the majority reaffirmed the Cohen
notion that words may not be banned merely because of their offen-
sive or vulgar nature.6 The Gooding Court also utilized the Cohen
actual addressee standard to determine whether speech would incite
prong measuring violence-creating potential and a subjective prong evaluating the actual
likelihood that violence will result).
50. See Philip Weinberg, R.A.V. and Mitchell Making Hate Crime a Trivial Pursuit, 25
Conn. L. Rev. 299, 310-11 (1993). The Court's focus on context, although contrary to Chaplinsky,
has been used by the Court in later fighting words cases. See, for example, Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105, 107 (1973); Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987). See also notes 51-66 and
accompanying text.
After determining that Cohen's slogan could not be regulated as fighting words, the Court
considered whether the state, as a guardian of public morality, could punish Cohen's speech.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22-23. The Court rejected this argument, asserting a broader view of expres-
sive freedom than established by Chaplinsky. Justice Harlan, writing for the Cohen majority,
stated that the government could protect citizens by prohibiting discourse only when substantial
privacy interests are invaded in an intolerable manner. Id. at 21. Concluding that communica-
tion serves both cognitive and emotive functions, the Court explicitly recognized that the First
Amendment safeguards the emotive elements of speech. Moreover, the emotive force often is the
more important element of the communicated message. Id. at 26.
The Court emphasized two additional reasons to protect offensive speech. First, it is difficult
to distinguish offensive words from other language because "one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric." Id. at 25. Second, censorship of particular words may lead to the unconstitutional sup-
pression of ideas. Id. at 26. Nonetheless, the fighting words doctrine remained intact after
Cohen, although in a narrower form than previously established by the Chaplinsky dicta.
51. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
52. Georgia Code Ann. § 26-6303 provided: "Any person who shall, without provocation, use
to or of another, and in his presence ... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause
a breach of the peace ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 518-19.
53. Wilson, a Vietnam War protester, threatened one officer, screaming, "White son of a
bitch, I'll kill you" and "You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death." Wilson also threatened
another police officer, "You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all
to pieces." Id. at 520 n.3.
54. Id. at 528.
55. Id. at 525. Webster's Dictionary defined "opprobrious" as "conveying or intended to
convey disgrace" and defined "abusive" as including "harsh insulting language." Id.
56. As previously discussed, this approach contradicted the Chaplinsky notion that equated
offensive and abusive speech with expression that incites violence. See note 37. See also
McGowan and Tangri, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 849 (cited in note 1); Weinberg, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 311
(cited in note 50).
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violence. The Court appeared to narrow the standard further,25
however, by requiring proof that the specific individual addressed
would be likely to react in an immediate, violent manner.8 The ma-
jority found the law unconstitutional because the statute allowed a
speaker of abusive statements to be convicted, even though the ad-
dressee could not respond immediately because of surrounding circum-
stances.59 This extremely narrow approach toward fighting words led
the dissent to assert that the Court merely was paying lip service to
Chaplinsky.6°
The Court's decisions after Gooding also emphasized the con-
text in which abusive language is used and inquired whether the
statement would incite violence in the actual addressee of the speech.
For example, the Court simultaneously considered three fighting
words cases only three months after Goodingel and remanded each of
these cases to the appropriate state courts in light of the Gooding
decision. Lewis v. City of New Orleans62 one case in this trilogy, later
returned to the Supreme Court on appeal.63 On prior remand, the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a statute that banned the use of
obscene language toward any city police officer serving in the line of
duty.64 Even though the Louisiana court maintained that the law
prohibited only fighting words, the Supreme Court rejected the state
court's narrow construction and struck down the law as facially over-
broad.65 The Court concluded that the offensive, opprobrious insults
regulated under the statute may provoke only anger in an officer, not
a violent reaction, and therefore warranted constitutional protection.66
57. Weinberg, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 311 (cited in note 50).
58. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528.
59. Id. at 526.
60. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972);
Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
62. 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
63. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
64. The statute's language made it unlawful "wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene
or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the
actual performance of his duty." Id. at 132.
65. When her son was being arrested, Ms. Lewis called the arresting officers "god damn
m[other] f[ucking] police." Id. at 131 n.1.
66. Id. at 133-34. Justice Powell suggested that offensive language uttered to an arresting
officer may never be considered fighting words because of the circumstances surrounding arrest
and the position of a police officer. Id. at 135-36 (Powell, J., concurring). At least one lower court
has agreed that abusive language spoken to officers should not be labeled fighting words because
an immediate violent reaction is unlikely to result. See Garvey v. State, 537 S.W.2d 709, 711
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
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As discussed in this subpart, judicial precedent prior to R.A.V.
clearly demonstrates that the Court diluted the fighting words
doctrine exception after Chaplinsky. The Court seems to have elimi-
nated the Chaplinsky injury prong, relying exclusively on the likeli-
hood that expression would prompt a violent reaction. 7 Moreover, the
Court focused on the context in which the fighting words were used,
not the content of the speech. Mere offensiveness of expression does
not strip speech of First Amendment protection. Instead, the later
cases considered whether the words were used as a direct personal
insult likely to cause a violent reaction in the actual addressee.68
C. Doctrinal Flaws in the Fighting Words Exception
Because the Supreme Court developed such a narrow fighting
words exception prior to R.A.V., many scholars speculated that the
doctrine had no strength in First Amendment jurisprudence.69
67. Note that in R.A V., the concurring Justices found the St. Paul ordinance
unconstitutional based on overbreadth grounds because the ordinance prohibited expression that
caused hurt feelings or resentment. R.A V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2560 (1992) (White,
J., concurring). This holding further reflects the Court's willingness to eliminate the injury prong.
Note, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 1129-30 (cited in note 26).
68. Weinberg, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 312 (cited in note 50); Note, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 311-12
(cited in note 26) (stating that Cohen rejected the Chaplinsky notion that states may punish
expression that merely disturbs public tranquility). But see Greenawalt, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. at
298 (cited in note 2) (stating that neither statutory nor constitutional standards should require a
particular addressee to act violently).
Even though the Supreme Court appeared to support a subjective fighting words standard
that focused on the context of the speech, state courts adopted varying interpretations of the
fighting words construct before R.A V. Compare, for example, People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549
N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (1989), and Estes v. State, 660 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tx. Ct. App. 1983) (adopting a
Chaplinsky-type standard observing the content of the questionable speech), with State v.
Fratzke, 446 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Iowa 1989), and City of Maryville v. Costin, 805 S.W.2d 331, 332
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (observing the context of the questionable speech).
69. See, for example, Shea, 63 Ky. L. J. at 1-2 (cited in note 24) (asserting that the Supreme
Court gradually has concluded that fighting words are a protected form of speech); Gard, 58
Wash. U. L. Q. at 536 (cited in note 22) (proposing that the fighting words doctrine is no more
than a "quaint remnant of an earlier morality that has no place in a democratic society dedicated
to the principle of free expression); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Court is 'merely paying lip service to Chaplin sky"). See also Strossen, 1990 Duke L. J. at
510-11 n.130 (cited in note 9). Strossen quotes a letter from Professor Gerald Gunther to
Professor George Parker, Chair of the Student Conduct Legislative Council at Stanford Univer-
sity (May 1, 1989), which stated:
[Tihere has been only one case in the history of the Supreme Court in which a majority of
the Justices has ever found a statement to be a punishable resort to 'fighting words."..,
More important, in the nearly half-century since Chaplinsky, there have been repeated
appeals to the Court to recognize the applicability of the "fighting words" exception....
[I]n every one of the subsequent attempted reliances on that exception, the Supreme
Court has refused to affirm the challenged convictions. In short, one must wonder about
the strength of an exception which, while theoretically recognized, has ever since 1942 not
been found apt in practice.
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Moreover, some commentators advocate abandoning the fighting
words notion.70 Their writings emphasize numerous flaws in the
exception. First, individuals criticize the doctrine's focus on the
likelihood of violent reactions by an addressee. The commentators
acknowledge that degrading epithets arouse anger and annoyance in
addressees; however, they contend that the statements are not likely
to provoke an uncontrollable, reflexive violent reaction as required by
the doctrine. 71 The frequency of derogatory comments has promoted
the belief that a reasonable addressee should tolerate them as ordi-
nary jostling, not as language justifying a violent reaction.72
Furthermore, fighting words may cause certain persons to withdraw,
not fight, because individuals subject to verbal abuse often internalize
their harm rather than escalate to conflict. 73
Second, some commentators maintain that the fighting words
construct is gender-biased because it recognizes and validates stereo-
typically male responses to abusive speech.74 As previously discussed,
the Court has shifted to an actual addressee standard, inquiring
whether the speech in dispute would be likely to incite an immediate
violent reaction by the actual addressee of the speech.75 The standard
seems absurd, however, if one considers that a person insulting a
strong man with violent tendencies could be punished, yet a woman or
trained police officer could be insulted freely because they probably
would not react violently to a derogatory comment.76 Moreover, the
fighting words doctrine problematically assumes that violence is an
appropriate, sensible reaction to abusive speech in some circum-
Id. (emphasis in original).
70. See, for example, Gard, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. at 581 (cited in note 22); Note, 106 Harv. L.
Rev. at 1140-46 (cited in note 26) (outlining various reasons to eliminate the doctrine).
71. See, for example, Gard, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. at 573 (cited in note 22). See also
Greenawalt, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. at 299 (cited in note 2) (proposing that the hurt in particular
instances may not be correlated with the willingness to fight).
72. Sean M. SeLegue, Campus Anti-Slur Regulations: Speakers, Victims, and the First
Amendment, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 919, 933-34 (1991); Matsuda, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2355 (cited in note
8).
73. Matsuda, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2355-56 (cited in note 8); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and
Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 233 (1991).
74. These critics emphasize that the focus on retaliation is based on a male psychological
phenomenon that has no application to a more 'feminine" or physically weaker individual. See
SeLegue, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 932 (cited in note 72); Matsuda, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2355 (cited in note
8); Marianne Wesson, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The Pornographer as Censor, 66 Wash. L. Rev.
913, 934 (1991).
75. See notes 49-50, 57-66, and accompanying text.
76. Shea, 63 Ky. L. J. at 22 (cited in note 24). See also Greenawalt, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. at




stances.77 Governments should not condone violent responses to eth-
nic slurs or insults, no matter how offensive the speech. The fighting
words exception, in contrast, allows a socially undesirable response to
dictate the legal standard, an approach inconsistent with other areas
of law.78
Third, many scholars fear that the fighting words exception
increases the risk that governmental officials may use the doctrine to
censor unpopular groups or apply the exception in frivolous cases. 79
The vast majority of fighting words cases involve derogatory com-
ments addresssed to police officers80 In these instances, officers may
abuse fighting words regulations to suppress disrespectful comments
or sincere allegations of misconduct.81  Furthermore, courts have
encountered great difficulty distinguishing fighting words from
protected, offensive expression.8 2 Some state courts improperly have
classified abusive language as fighting words when individuals have
voiced their opinions on political or social issues8- expression that
clearly contributes to the marketplace of ideas and merits the highest
level of constitutional protection.
As evidenced by the numerous criticisms and various ap-
proaches to the fighting words doctrine, courts and scholars repeatedly
have disagreed about the the application and viability of the concept.
The Supreme Court has diluted the Chaplinsky fighting words model
drastically, yet the Court often has reasserted the opinion's broad
dicta. After fifty years of inconsistent applications and murky stan-
dards, the fighting words doctrine needed judicial clarification. In the
77. SeLegue, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 932 (cited in note 72).
78. See Note, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 1141 & n.84 (cited in note 26).
79. Id. at 1142. See also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 474 (1985) (implying that standards such as the fighting
words doctrine are unfavorable because they fail to curb the discretion of officials from imposing
current majoritarian values).
80. Gard, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. at 565 (cited in note 22).
81. Id. at 566. Various Supreme Court opinions reflect the belief that officials may abuse
their discretion to suppress expression. See, for example, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
271 (1951) (requiring laws restraining expression to provide "narrowly drawn, reasonable and
definite standards for officials to follow"); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 947, 964 n.12 (1984) (stating that a statute that 'plac[es] discretion in the hands of an official
... creates a threat of censorship that by its very existence chills free speech").
82. For a general discussion of lower courts' application of the fighting words doctrine, see
Kobel, Comment, 84 Dickinson L. Rev. at 90-95 (cited in note 24).
83. See Gard, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. at 565 (cited in note 22). Many commentators assert that
lower courts have applied the doctrine improperly in many cases. See, for example, id.; Strossen,
1990 Duke L. J. at 512 (cited in note 9). Justice Douglas also expressed concern about the state
courts' application of the doctrine. See Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924, 928 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that "[s]tate courts.., have consistently shown either inability
or unwillingness to apply its teaching"). Ironically, Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court decision
establishing the fighting words doctrine, involved the expression of a purely political opinion.
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midst of this doctrinal confusion, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.8
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: THE SUPREME CouRT's DECISION IN
R.A.V. V. CITY OF ST. PAUL
On the night of June 21, 1990, R.A.V. and five other young
men burned a cross in the fenced yard of an African-American family's
home. 85 R.A.V. was charged with a misdemeanor under the St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,6 but the trial court dismissed the
charge against R.A.V. It held that the ordinance was substantially
overbroad and impermissibly content-based, violating the First
Amendment on its face.7 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's decision and upheld the law as constitutional.s It rejected
R.A.V.'s overbreadth claim,s9 interpreting the statute to prohibit only
fighting words9o and conduct that is likely to incite imminent lawless
action.9' The court conceded that the ordinance should have been
drafted more carefully; nevertheless, it reasoned that the law could be
interpreted to ban only expressions of hatred that were unprotected by
the First Amendment.92
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota
Supreme Court and declared the ordinance violative of the First
Amendment. Although all nine Justices agreed that the statute was
unconstitutional, the foundations of the majority and concurring deci-
sions were markedly different.
84. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
85. Id. at 2541. Before the R.A V. incident, the family were subjects of other forms of racial
harassment. For example, the tires on the family's car were slashed, and their children were
called various degrading names. Young, Recent Development, 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 905
(cited in note 24).
86. R.A V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. The ordinance provided: "Whoever places on public or
private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not
limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. (quoting St. Paul Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn. Leg. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
87. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at2541.
88. In the Matter of the Welfare of R.A.V, 464 N.W.2d 507,511 (Minn. 1991).
89. Id.at510.
90. Id. (reciting both prongs of the Chaplinsky fighting words definition). But see
Weinberg, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 301 (cited in note 50) (contending that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's construction was "overly simplistic" and that the St. Paul ordinance "plainly encom-
passe[d] far more speech than the narrow, unprotected class of... fighting words").
91. R.AV., 464 N.W.2d at 510 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
92. R.A V., 464 N.W.2d at 511.
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A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion, writing for five of
the nine Justices.9 3 The majority accepted the state court's assertion
that the ordinance banned only fighting words, defined as speech
"that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence."14
Justice Scalia, however, construed the Chaplinsky fighting words
doctrine differently than the Court's prior decisions. According to the
majority opinion, fighting words are void of constitutional protection
because the mode of the expression-the "nonspeech" element of
communication-is unprotected, yet the content of fighting words is
safeguarded under the First Amendment.9 5 Justice Scalia analogized
fighting words to a noisy sound truck; the government may regulate
the use of the vehicle because the loudness of the truck's speaker
annoys city residents, but it may not regulate the vehicle's use based
on the message conveyed over the loudspeaker. In other words, the
noisiness of the truck (a nonspeech element) does not invoke First
Amendment protection, even though the message (a speech element)
is constitutionally protected. Therefore, a state could prohibit a
particular mode of communication-for example, loud sound
trucks-provided that the time, place, or manner regulation is not
aimed at the content of the expression conveyed by the mode.96
Similarly, fighting words are not protected because the expression
embodies a "particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode
of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey,"97 yet the
message conveyed by fighting words may not be regulated but for the
intolerable mode used to convey the idea.
Even though the majority accepted that the St. Paul ordinance
regulated only fighting words, the Court declared the law facially
invalid.98 Unlike a constitutional time, place, or manner restriction,
93. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Souter joined Justice
Scalia.
94. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (quoting R.AV., 464 N.W.2d at 510 (citing Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572)).
95. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
96. Time, place, or manner restrictions regulate modes of expression based on the loudness,
brightness, or other disturbing aspects of the communicative form, regardless of the message
conveyed by the speech. Justice Scalia's sound truck analogy is based on Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949). For other content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions, see Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding a regulation prohibiting
camping in certain national parks when applied to a group of demonstrators); City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding a city ordinance banning the posting of
signs on public property).
97. R.A.V., 112S. Ct. at2549.
98. Id. at 2542.
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the St. Paul ordinance regulated particular fighting words based on
the content of the expression. The ordinance prohibited only certain
types of fighting words-those insults based on race, color, creed,
religion, or gender-because of the disfavored message conveyed by
the speech, yet did not regulate fighting words based on other less
disfavored ideas-for example, political affiliation or homosexuality. 9
The sound truck analogy better explains this concept. As pre-
viously discussed, a government may prohibit the use of sound trucks
because the noise may annoy residents of a community provided that
the regulation applies to all sound trucks, regardless of the message
conveyed. In contrast, a city could not prohibit only sound trucks used
by Republican candidates yet allow Democrats to campaign with the
same mode of communication. This type of regulation targets the
constitutionally protected content of the speech, not the method used
to convey the message.100 Likewise, the St. Paul ordinance sought to
regulate certain types of fighting words based on hostility toward the
offensive content of the particular expression-for example, abusive
invective based on race or gender-but did not regulate other fighting
words conveying other messages-for example, abusive language
toward homosexuals. Therefore, the St. Paul ordinance was facially
unconstitutional.ol
Although contending that content discrimination between sub-
classes of fighting words is presumptively invalid, °2 the Court con-
cluded that the First Amendment does not place an absolute prohibi-
tion on content discrimination in areas of otherwise unprotected
speech.' °3 According to the Court, content discrimination poses no
threat of driving certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace of
ideas in four situations. First, if the discrimination is based on the
same reason that an entire category of speech is excluded from First
Amendment protection, the content distinction is constitutional.10 4
Justice Scalia illustrated this exception with several examples. For
instance, threats of violence as a class of speech receive no First
Amendment protection because the threats create a fear of violence,
99. Id.
100. Justice Scalia cited several examples to demonstrate the difference between regulations
aimed at the content of speech and regulations aimed at the mode of speech. For example, he
argued that the government may criminalize threats of violence against the President; however,
they may not criminalize only threats against the Chief Executive that allude to his policy on
inner city aid. Id. at 2546.
101. Id.at2547.
102. Id. at 2542.
103. Id. at 2545.
104. Id.
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disrupt society, and may erupt into the actual threatened act.105 The
government could prohibit all violent threats based on these reasons,
or it could criminalize only violent threats against the President of the
United States because the same factors-fear, disruption, and actual
violence-apply with special force to the President. The regulation of
such threats, although limited only to ones against the President, is
grounded in sufficiently neutral reasoning that constitutionally ex-
cludes the entire class of violent threats; therefore, the discrimination
poses no serious danger of viewpoint or idea discrimination. 106 In
contrast, the government could not prohibit only violent threats
against the President regarding his policy on aid to inner cities
because the law would seek to stifle expression based on a particular
viewpoint-disagreement with presidential policy-and would
unconstitutionally suppress the opinion from the marketplace of
ideas.10 7
According to the R.A.V. majority, the St. Paul ordinance clearly
did not fall within this first exception. As previously discussed, fight-
ing words receive no constitutional protection because the expression
embodies an intolerable mode of communication. 0 8 Under this first
exception, a content-discriminatory fighting words regulation must
depend on the intolerableness of the mode of communication, not on
the offensiveness of the expression's content. The content
discrimination in the St. Paul ordinance clearly was not based on the
mode of the expression. The ordinance did not single out any
particularly offensive manner of expression; rather, the law sought to
regulate expressions of racial, gender, or religious hatred. °9 An
individual could insult an African-American and a homosexual in the
same intolerable manner yet only be punished for the racial invective.
This suppression of particular ideas, according to the Court, clearly
conflicts with the First Amendment."10
The majority next proposed a second exception for content dis-
crimination between subclasses of proscribable speech. The govern-
ment may treat content-defined subclasses differently if the govern-
ment is concerned not with the offensiveness of the content, but rather
with certain "secondary effects" associated with a particular con-
105. Id. at 2546.
106. Id. at 2545.46.
107. See id. at 2546.
108. See text accompanying notes 95-97.




tent.""' Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.112 best demonstrates the
secondary effects analysis. In Renton, the Court upheld a city zoning
ordinance that required placement of all adult theaters at least 1000
feet from any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling,
church, park, or school." 3 The Court maintained that the ordinance
did not aim to suppress the content of adult movies. Rather, the zon-
ing scheme sought to curb the harmful secondary effects of adult thea-
ters in the community-increased crime, lower property values, an
unhealthy retail industry, and a lesser quality of life." 4 The R.A.V.
Court, however, held that the secondary effects doctrine did not apply
to the St. Paul ordinance.115 The city claimed that the law protected
against the victimization of persons who historically have been sub-
jected to discrimination.116 The Court rejected this secondary effects
argument, concluding that the ordinance sought solely to suppress the
emotive force of speech." 7 A listener's reactions to offensive speech are
not legitimate secondary effects;118 the reactions are direct effects of
the expression that contribute to the marketplace of ideas and are
therefore protected.
Third, the Court asserted that content-based subclasses of
unprotected speech may be regulated if the expression is included
incidentally within the scope of a statute aimed at conduct rather
than speech." 9 As long as the government does not target conduct
based on its expressive content, acts are not constitutionally protected
merely because they depict a discriminatory idea.120 According to
Justice Scalia, Title VII121 exemplifies this third exception. The use of
sexually derogatory fighting words in the workplace-a content-based
subclass of unprotected speech--could constitute a violation of Title
VII, which regulates employment discrimination based on sex. Nev-
ertheless, regulation of this subclass does not violate the First
111. Id. at 2546.
112. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
113. Id. at 43.
114. Id. at 47-48.
115. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2549 n.7.
118. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a law prohibiting the
display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy tending to bring a foreign government
into "public odium").
119. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at2546.
120. Id. at 2546-47.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
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Amendment; the law seeks to proscribe discriminatory conduct, not
the sexual content of the prohibited speech.122
Lastly, the Court created a catch-all exception allowing selec-
tive regulation of unprotected speech if the nature of the discrimina-
tion reflects that no governmental suppression of ideas could be in-
volved.123 As previously discussed, the Court strongly rejected the
notion that the St. Paul ordinance did not aim to suppress ideas.124
The statute selectively prohibited the use of fighting words that ad-
dressed specific disfavored subjects-race, gender, and religion--clearly
resulting in the governmental suppression of certain messages.125
Even though the St. Paul ordinance was a content-based re-
striction on expression, the Court still maintained that the law would
be constitutional if (1) a compelling governmental interest supported
the ordinance, and (2) the content-discriminatory nature of the law
was necessary to serve that interest. 26 The Court concluded that the
ordinance served a compelling interest because it protected members
of groups who historically have been subjected to discrimination.127
The ordinance, however, failed to meet the second prong of the test.
Content discrimination was not reasonably necessary to achieve the
law's compelling interest. Instead, a content-neutral law prohibiting
all fighting words, not just insults based on religion, gender, or race,
would protect the rights of individuals sufficiently and survive
constitutional scrutiny.128
B. The Concurring Opinions
The concurring Justices agreed that the St. Paul ordinance
violated the First Amendment, but their agreement with the majority
ended there. In his concurrence, Justice White sharply attacked the
majority opinion, arguing that the ordinance should be invalidated on
overbreadth grounds. 2 9 Justice Stevens joined in part with Justice
White, agreeing that the law was overbroad and unconstitutional. 30
He contended, however, that both Justices Scalia and White were
122. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47. The City of St. Paul did not assert that the bias-motivated
ordinance solely targeted conduct; hence, the Court did not address the ordinance in light of this
exception.
123. Id. at 2547.
124. See text accompanying notes 98-101.
125. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
126. Id. at 2549-50.
127. Id. at 2549.
128. Id. at 2550.
129. Id. (White, J., concurring). See also Part lI.B.1.
130. R.A V., 112 S. Ct. at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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incorrect with their absolutist approaches to the First Amendment.
Instead, Justice Stevens proposed that the Court should consider a
variety of factors when addressing First Amendment questions.13 '
Justice Blackmun also filed a short opinion emphasizing the possible
problematic effects of the majority opinion. 3 2
1. Justice White's Opinion
Justice White authored a concurring opinion on behalf of three
other Justices. 33  Although he agreed that the St. Paul ordinance
violated the First Amendment, he adopted a view of the fighting
words doctrine completely different than the Court's view. His opinion
strongly attacked the majority's reasoning, accusing them of ignoring
well-established First Amendment principles.134
First, he criticized the majority for safeguarding categories of
expression traditionally not protected by the First Amendment.135
According to Justice White, certain categories of expression are void of
constitutional protection because the expressive content of the speech
is "worthless" or "of de minimis value to society."'136 The expression is
excluded from the First Amendment because the speech makes no con-
tribution to the marketplace of ideas.13 7  For example, the First
Amendment does not protect maliciously false information because the
communication does not promote the discovery of truth in society. 138
Fighting words, Justice White asserted, is one such category of
unprotected speech. The unprotected element of fighting words,
however, is not an intolerable mode of communication as claimed by
Justice Scalia. In contrast, the content of the speech-the message
conveyed by the expression-makes no contribution to the market-
place of ideas. Fighting words are not a means of exchanging views,
rallying supporters, or registering a protest; they are words directed
131. Id. at 2567. See also Part. mI.B.2.
132. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
133. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun joined Justice White's opinion. Justice Stevens also
joined this opinion in part.
134. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2551 (White, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2553.
136. Id. at 2552.
137. For a description of the marketplace of ideas notion, see note 1 and accompanying text.
138. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that false
information about a public official for public acts printed with actual malice is not protected under
the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-46 (1974) (holding that false
information printed about private persons generally is not protected under the First
Amendment).
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against individuals solely to incite violence or inflict injury.139 Because
the content of fighting words warrants no First Amendment
protection, a prohibition on fighting words is not a content-neutral
time, place, or manner restriction as suggested by the majority
opinion. It is a ban on a class of unprotected speech that may be
regulated freely for any rational reason. 1'
Justice White next criticized Justice Scalia for developing a list
of "ad hoc exceptions" to the Court's unprecedented fighting words
doctrine. 141 Justice White contended that the first exception drawn by
the Court-one allowing content-based restrictions of unprotected
speech when the distinctions are based on the same reason that the
entire class of speech is unprotected4--essentially undercuts the
majority's rule that content-based regulations of unprotected speech
are presumptively unconstitutional."4 3 Furthermore, the St. Paul
ordinance reflected the weaknesses of this exception. Fighting words
are unprotected because the content of the speech has no value in the
marketplace of ideas.144 Governments may choose to regulate fighting
words because the speech conveys a message of personal injury and
imminent violence, a message of special concern when directed against
groups who historically have been subjected to discrimination. 45
Therefore, the St. Paul ordinance, a content-based subclass of fighting
words addressing race, religion, or gender issues, clearly fits within
the majority's exception. I4
139. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
140. See id. at 2556-57.
141. Id. at 2556. Justice White maintained that these exceptions may have been an effort to
restrict the effects of the Court's decision to the facts of this specific case or an attempt to
anticipate some of the questions arising from the majority's revision of the First Amendment. Id.
Whatever the purpose, Justice White believed that the exceptions only added confusion to the
First Amendment. Id. at 2558.
142. For a discussion of this exception, see text accompanying notes 104-10.
143. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2556 (White, J., concurring).
144. See id. at 2553.
145. Id. at 2556.
146. Justice White also criticized Justice Scalia's secondary effects and conduct regulations
exceptions, claiming that the majority created the exceptions solely to uphold hostile work
environment claims in light of the majority's fighting words analysis. Id. at 2557. Otherwise,
Title VIrs prohibition of sexually derogatory language in the workplace would be unconstitutional
because the statute prohibits expression on a 'disfavored topic"-sexual harassment. Id. Justice
White, however, argued that the exceptions carved out by the majority, under close analysis,
actually do not justify hostile work environment claims. The secondary effects analysis does not
apply because hostile work environment claims protect the emotional impact of the derogatory
expression on the worker, the same primary effect reached by the St. Paul ordinance. Id.
Furthermore, the Court's focus on Title Vi's regulation of discriminatory conduct ignored the
language of the statute that directly reaches expression creating a hostile work environ-
ment-language constituting more than a mere "incidental" effect on speech. Id.
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Finally, Justice White criticized the majority for creating what
he called an "underinclusiveness" standard. Under Justice Scalia's
analysis, a content-discriminatory law prohibiting a subclass of unpro-
tected speech is unconstitutional if the expression could be regulated
sufficiently by a broader law banning the entire category of unpro-
tected speech. In other words, a law prohibiting only a subset of fight-
ing words-insults based on race, for example-would be unconstitu-
tional if the racial slurs could be regulated under a law proscribing all
fighting words without reference to the message conveyed by the
speech. According to Justice White, this analysis is senseless and ulti-
mately has an adverse effect on the First Amendment. Under the
concurring Justices' construct, fighting words receive no protection
solely because the message conveyed by the speech does not contribute
to the marketplace of ideas. Consequently, any subclass of the unpro-
tected speech may be regulated if the legislature observes a need for
the legislation. For example, prohibiting fighting words that abuse
persons on the basis of race would diminish the "social evil[s]" of racial
insults without eliminating any viewpoints contributing to the mar-
ketplace.147 The majority's "underinclusiveness" standard, however,
would not allow a legislature to focus its efforts on a particular type of
fighting words unless the ordinance included a catch-all phrase pro-
hibiting "'all other fighting words that may constitutionally be subject
to this ordinance."' 14 Under the Court's standard, the content of
fighting words possesses enough value in the marketplace of ideas
that the words may not be prohibited selectively, even though the
speech traditionally has been excluded from First Amendment protec-
tion. By protecting the content of the speech, the majority ultimately
legitimizes fighting words as a form of public discourse-a conclusion
that seemingly contradicts all past First Amendment jurisprudence. 49
Instead of using an underinclusiveness doctrine riddled with
confusing exceptions, Justice White concluded that R.A.V. should be
decided on traditional overbreadth grounds. He found the St. Paul
ordinance substantially overbroad because the law unconstitutionally
criminalized a substantial amount of protected expression. 150
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to follow
Chaplinsky, Justice White believed that the state court erred in its
147. Id. at 2553.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2553-54.
150. Id. at 2559.
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application and rendered the ordinance facially overbroad.51 The
state court emphasized that the law censored expression known to
create anger, alarm, or resentment in individuals; however, these
reactions do not deprive speech of constitutional protection.52 In fact,
this type of hostile reaction often indicates that the expression
contributes significantly to the marketplace of ideas. Therefore,
Justice White found the ordinance facially invalid.
2. Justice Stevens's Opinion
Justice Stevens agreed that the St. Paul ordinance was over-
broad and unconstitutional,'5 but he criticized Justice Scalia's and
Justice White's opinions for developing unworkable, overly rigid
fighting words constructs.'5 First, Justice Stevens attacked the
majority's assertion that a government must regulate the entire
category of fighting words or none at all. 55 He strongly opposed the
notion that content-based regulations of unprotected speech are
presumptively unconstitutional. 15 In contrast, he contended that
regulations of content are a legitimate aspect of First Amendment
jurisprudence.57 The Court's opinion, he argued, "turn[ed] First
Amendment law on its head" and elevated the protection of fighting
words-a traditionally unprotected form of speech-to a level
equivalent with core political speech, the most highly protected form of
discourse in the marketplace of ideas.15
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2559-60 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), and Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971), among other cases).
153. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2567.
155. Id. at 2562-63.
156. Id. at 2564.
157. Id. at 2563-64. For example, Justice Stevens cited FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (upholding a restriction on broadcasting specific indecent words), and Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinances regulating movie
theaters based on the content of films shown).
158. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564-65 (Stevens, J., concurring). Because the majority prohibited
selective regulations of fighting words, Justice Stevens felt that the Court provided more
protection for fighting words than for commercial speech. The Supreme Court affords commercial
speech only quasi-protection under the First Amendment. Weinberg, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 304
(cited in note 50) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980)). Unlike the fighting words methodology proposed by Justice Scalia, the Court allows
content-based discrimination for commercial speech. Weinberg, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 304 (cited in
note 50) (citing Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986)
(holding that the "greater power" to regulate casino gambling included the "lesser power" to
regulate advertising to particular persons); Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
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Next, Justice Stevens rejected Justice White's categorical ap-
proach to the First Amendment. According to Justice Stevens, strip-
ping protection from certain categories of expression based on the
content of the speech "sacrifices subtlety for clarity" and ultimately is
unsound. 59 He asserted that drawing bright lines between "protected"
and "unprotected" speech and between "content-based" and "content-
neutral" regulations presented an overly simplistic approach that
could not be applied in a workable, coherent fashion.160 Instead, he
advocated adopting a multifactor test to determine the constitution-
ality of ordinances regulating speech: a court should scrutinize the
content of the regulated speech, the context in which the expression is
used, the nature of the restriction, and the scope of the regulation.1 61
Applying his multifactor test, Justice Stevens concluded that
the St. Paul ordinance, if limited to fighting words, would be a legiti-
mate regulation of unprotected speech.16 2 First, the ordinance hypo-
thetically prohibited only fighting words, a "low-value" speech accord-
ing to Justice Stevens.163 Moreover, the ordinance banned expressive
conduct, not written or spoken communication, and the government
has more flexibility to regulate this activity.1 64 Second, the context of
the speech-a burning cross directed toward a family trapped in their
home-amounted to nothing more than crude intimidation embroiled
with racial hostility.6, Lastly, the restriction was an evenhanded
regulation of fighting words based on the harm caused by the speech
to insulted individuals.16 The ordinance did not seek to suppress
certain viewpoints or favor one side of any debate. Instead, the law
uniformly prohibited any person, whether they advocated tolerance or
intolerance, from using fighting words based on race, gender, or relig-
ion.16 7 Therefore, if the St. Paul ordinance had not been overbroad,
Justice Stevens would have upheld the law as constitutional. 68
469, 475 (1989) (holding selective regulation of commercial speech constitutional if the ban
promoted safety, security, and residential tranquility)).
159. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 2569.
161. Id. at 2567-69.
162. Id. at 2571.
163. Id. at 2569.
164. Id. at 2568.
165. Id. at 2569.





3. Justice Blackmun's Opinion
Justice Blackmun wrote a short opinion expressing his con-
cerns about the possible effects of the majority's opinion. He asserted
that the case may or may not serve as a precedent for future judicial
decisions. Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun concluded that both
options produce disheartening results.169
If cited as precedent, Justice Blackmun believed the opinion
will weaken the Court's traditional protections of speech. In order to
regulate unprotected expression that injures others, the majority
opinion requires states to regulate unprotected expression that may
not cause problems in society. This approach appears to give all
speech, whether or not traditionally safeguarded under the First
Amendment, the same level of protection; content-based restrictions of
any speech-protected or unprotected-will be invalid unless the
regulation narrowly addresses a compelling state interest. Justice
Blackmun contended that this identical treatement of all expression
inevitably will weaken the level of protection for all traditionally safe-
guarded speech.170
In contrast, Justice Blackmun argued that the opinion will not
alter First Amendment jurisprudence significantly if the case is
regarded as an instance in which the Court invalidated an ordinance
simply because the Justices opposed the law's premise.1 7' This action,
however, would reflect the Court's digression from its proper task.
Justice Blackmun feared that the majority strayed from the issue
before the Court to decide controversial issues of political correctness
and cultural diversity. According to Justice Blackmun, this result
might be even more disheartening than if the case served as harmful
precedent in the future.172
IV. THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUSTICES' OPINIONS
As previously discussed, the Justices proposed drastically dif-
ferent interpretations of the fighting words doctrine. In the majority
opinion, Justice Scalia reinvigorated the fighting words exception, a
doctrine virtually eliminated by cases after ChaplinskyY17
169. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
170. Id.
171. According to Justice Blackmun, the premise behind the St. Paul ordinance was "that
racial threats and verbal assaults [cause] greater harm than other fighting words." Id. at 2560-61.
172. Id. at2561.
173. See generally Part H.B.
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Unfortunately, his opinion only increases the confusion surrounding
the fighting words doctrine, a concept that has plagued the Court
throughout the last fifty years. Justice White proposed an exception
that more closely conforms with the Court's fighting words precedent,
yet his opinion also uses the ambiguous fighting words rhetoric
employed by the Court in those cases-rhetoric that includes notions
of injury, imminent violence, and other subjective standards allowing
extreme judicial discretion. One can abstract a narrow workable
version of the fighting words doctrine from his opinion, however, that
provides a constitutional exception sensibly conforming with First
Amendment jurisprudence.
A. Justice Scalia's Analysis
Justice Scalia's opinion proposed a fighting words construct
never embraced previously by the Court. Under his analysis, fighting
words are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection
because the speech embodies an unprotected mode of expression. The
content of fighting words, in contrast, contributes to the marketplace
of ideas and thus receives First Amendment protection. Therefore,
according to Justice Scalia, government may not base fighting words
restrictions on hostility toward the message conveyed by the speech.
The regulations are time, place, or manner restrictions that solely
limit the mode of expression.17 4
Justice Scalia suggested a new, unprecedented approach to the
fighting words doctrine, but in his search for an innovative method, he
failed to realize numerous faults in his reasoning. First, he analogized
fighting words to a sound truck, asserting that both modes of expres-
sion may be regulated by time, place, or manner restrictions. 17 6
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia failed to complete his analysis. He
claimed that fighting words embody an unprotected nonspeech
element of communication, yet he never clearly described what
nonexpressive aspect of the speech strips fighting words of First
Amendment protection.' 8  Admittedly, he commented that the St.
Paul ordinance legimately could have regulated only fighting words
that communicated ideas in a threatening, as opposed to obnoxious,
174. See text accompanying notes 95-97.
175. For a discussion of time, place, or manner regulations, see note 96.
176. Ironically, Justice Scalia accepted the city's assertion that the St. Paul ordinance only
prohibited fighting words, R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2542, yet he did not explain what nonexpressive
element of speech was regulated by the ordinance.
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manner. His example, however, further exemplifies another major
weakness in his opinion: in order to determine if words are threaten-
ing-that is, if they are fighting words-a court inevitably must look
at the content of the speech, not merely the mode of expression. When
an individual hurls threatening language at another person, the ad-
dressee does not feel intimidated merely by the noise or loudness of
the speaker's voice; he experiences intimidation because of the
speaker's choice of words and the message conveyed by the expression.
Contrary to Justice Scalia's assertion, the impact of speech-whether
the expression embodies "an especially offensive mode"177-is insepara-
ble from the offensive content of speech. Hence, the "fighting" element
of Justice Scalia's fighting words analysis, contrary to his assertions,
is the offensive message conveyed by the speech.
Although Justice Scalia's analysis appears at face value to
embody a narrow fighting words exception, his construct actually
could justify shockingly broad intrusions into the First Amendment.
Justice Scalia proposed that content-discriminatory ordinances
regulating subclasses of fighting words are unconstitutional unless the
content discrimination is necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est.178 In other words, if a content-specific law like the St. Paul ordi-
nance can be replaced by a broader regulation prohibiting all fighting
words, then the former law would unconstitutional. This approach,
however, directly contradicts the traditional First Amendment notion
that government should interfere minimally with expression and
narrowly tailor speech regulations. By mandating legislatures to
enact only sweeping prohibitions of fighting words, the majority re-
quires the states to regulate problems that may not exist in society. 79
Furthermore, legislatures might construe this emphasis on broad,
content-neutral regulations as an invitation to place a blanket prohi-
bition on offensive speech. As previously discussed, Justice Scalia's
fighting words analysis removes fighting words from First
Amendment protection essentially because the language conveys a
disturbing message. The offensiveness of the mode of expression,
which Justice Scalia asserts may be regulated, actually is created by
the offensive content of the expression. Hence, under Justice Scalia's
177. Id. at 2549.
178. See id. at 2549-50.
179. The concurring Justices also found this consequence of the "underinclusive" standard
problematic. See id. at 2553-54 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Furthermore, the majority's methodology appears to conflict with the Court's recent assertion
that the First Amendment does not require the government to regulate nonexistent problems.
See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1856 (1992).
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analysis, a fighting words regulation is not a content-neutral time,
place, or manner restriction; the regulation inevitably targets the
speech's offensive content. Carrying his analysis further, a fighting
words restriction may not prohibit certain types of offensive
speech-for example, distasteful insults based on race, gender, or
religion. Instead, the ordinance must prohibit the entire category of
fighting words, a class of speech that under Justice Scalia's analysis is
actually void of constitutional protection because of its offensive
nature. Thus, under his fighting words construct, a state arguably
can pass a regulation prohibiting all offensive expression, a regulation
that clearly undercuts the general foundations behind the First
Amendment.
A final major flaw in Justice Scalia's opinion may present a
serious problem in future First Amendment cases. At the end of his
opinion, Justice Scalia suggested that the compelling interest test is
the appropriate standard of scrutiny when ordinances prohibit speech
based on hostility toward the expression's protected ideological con-
tent.'10 A content-discriminatory ordinance that seeks to suppress a
particular idea would be constitutional if the discrimination is nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.""' Justice Scalia's
conclusion, however, contradicts First Amendment precedent. Before
R.A. V., the Supreme Court absolutely protected First Amendment
speech when the government deliberately suppressed the expression
based on the content of the speech. 8 2 The content contributes to the
discovery of "truth" through the marketplace of ideas and may not be
repressed by majoritarian preferences."" Unfortunately, Justice
Scalia's application of the compelling interest test in R.A.V. could open
the door to unprecedented abridgement of protected speech. In effect,
the application of a compelling interest standard endorses censorship
if the government could assert an ideological interest great enough to
be labeled a compelling interest. Such censorship flies in the face of
past First Amendment jurisprudence.
180. See R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
181. Id.
182. See, for example, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating that "[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because government finds the idea itself offensive or disagree-
able"); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (quoting Johnson); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (stating that "the State certainly lacks the power to punish Cohen for the
underlying content of the message" conveyed by his jacket); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
448-49 (1969) (striking down the statute that prohibited advocacy of illegal conduct because the
law suppressed expression based on the message conveyed).
183. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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B. Justice White's Opinion: A Possible Solution?
Justice White proposed a completely different fighting words
construct: fighting words are unprotected because the content of the
speech does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas.1' In his
words, fighting words are "worthless" and of "de minimis value to
society. 185 The speech is not mere offensive expression that causes
anger, alarm, or resentment in nearby listeners.1' In contrast, fight-
ing words consist of purely insulting language addressed directly to
another person, speech that essentially invites the addressee to
fight. 187
If one carefully construes Justice White's emphasis on the
insulting nature of fighting words, a logical fighting words construct
emerges from his opinion: fighting words are pure interpersonal
insults directly addressed to another person in a private setting. By
limiting fighting words to this narrow construct, the exception be-
comes consistent with the primary foundation behind the First
Amendment-promoting the discovery of "truth" through the market-
place of ideas.18 Pure personal insults spoken to an individual in a
private setting convey no expressive message to the marketplace; the
speaker does not attempt to persuade the listener to adopt any view-
point, change the addressee's opinion, or contribute to our
organization as a society. In contrast, the speaker expresses herself
solely to hurt the addressee, degrade the individual, and intimidate
him from exercising his legal rights. Furthermore, this construct does
not undercut the holdings in cases like Cohen and Gooding. The
fighting words are not excluded from constitutional protection because
of their offensive nature. They are unprotected because truly
interpersonal insults do not add any expressions of opinion or values
into the marketplace of ideas.
Note that for direct, interpersonal insults to be excluded from
First Amendment protection, the insults must be expressed in a
purely private setting. Insulting language spoken in a public forum,
in contrast, requires some level of constitutional protection. Direct
insults addressed to another person clearly could convey a message to
the general public that may lead to a further exchange of ideas among
listeners. In fact, expressions of dislike in public are "the type of
184. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2551-52 (White, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 2552.
186. Id. at 2559.
187. Id. at 2553 n.4.
188. See note 1 and accompanying text.
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ideological communications that are within the very core of the protec-
tion accorded by the first amendment." 89 The public use of such lan-
guage, although reprehensible to many people, may express the
speaker's opinions or values, or even qualify as pure political speech in
certain circumstances. For example, if a pro-life advocate publicly
insults a pro-choice supporter by calling her a murderer or baby-killer,
these interpersonal insults cannot be separated from the viewpoints
being debated in public and therefore must be protected.
Furthermore, a speaker's motive should not determine whether her
opinions are protected in a public setting. Although the speaker may
express insults with the sole motive to hurt the addressee, hateful
speech directed at another in public may contribute to the market-
place by leading to further discussion, regardless of motive, thereby
expressing a message that must be tolerated' 90 to maintain the
strength of the First Amendment.
Thus, if limited to private, direct, personal insults, fighting
words clearly are an unprotected form of communication. The entire
class of private, one-on-one insults are not entitled to First
Amendment protection because these insults simply do not contribute
to the marketplace of ideas. As long as the government possesses a
rational basis to regulate such speech, the state could choose to pro-
hibit some insults, yet not others, and the regulation would not in-
fringe on the First Amendment in any way. Hence, the government
could proscribe only those types of fighting words addressing matters
that present an imminent concern in society. 191
189. Mannheimer, Note, 93 Colum. L. Rev. at 1559 (cited in note 49) (quoting Gard, 58 Wash.
U. L. Q. at 569 (cited in note 22)).
190. See note 2 (outlining tolerance as one justification for free speech). Some commentators
have argued that by encouraging toleration of hate speech, the government implicitly endorses
the message expressed, a message that contradicts fundamental values in the United States. See,
for example, Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 690-91
(1988). This argument is unfounded. Allowing individuals to express controversial speech-for
example, racial epithets-does not show support for the viewpoint expressed. In contrast,
protecting such discussion, although offensive to some individuals, is at the core of the market-
place of ideas notion. Moreover, the government may choose to combat hate speech and violence
through other means. For example, the state may use educational forums to discourage individ-
ual prejudices, or the government may choose to regulate acts other than speech. See
Greenawalt, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. at 305 (cited in note 2).
191. Admittedly, this version of fighting words, although logically sound and consistent with
the purposes of the First Amendment, only excludes a narrow category of speech from
constitutional protection. The class of pure, interpersonal insults is extremely limited and may be
hard to distinguish from a crude statement of views protected by the First Amendment. For
example, calling someone a "stupid nigger" or a "greedy Jew" are pure interpersonal insults that
could be regulated as fighting words if spoken in a private setting. Similar statements spoken to
an audience including African-Americans or Jewish persons, however, would be protected. See,




Since its creation, the fighting words doctrine has been a prob-
lematic First Amendment exception and has produced inconsistent
jurisprudential analyses and results. The Supreme Court neither has
interpreted nor applied the doctrine clearly. Moreover, the two
starkly opposing fighting words constructs in R.A.V. exemplify the
unclearness of the doctrine, and taken at face value, their opinions
appear to further confuse the already muddled doctrine. The majority
advocated a time, place, and manner approach to regulate fighting
words, yet they did not explain the practical application of their
methodology. Furthermore, the majority's underinclusiveness
approach could weaken the fabric of the First Amendment inexcus-
ably, possibly justifying a blanket prohibition of offensive speech.
In contrast, Justice White's concurrence, if refined, embodies a
possible solution to the fighting words confusion. The fighting words
exception should be limited to direct, interpersonal, purely private
insults-insults that have no value in the marketplace of ideas. This
narrow view of fighting words provides a logical exception to the First
Amendment that will not infringe on areas of protected expression. It
adheres to traditional First Amendment foundations because it only
prohibits speech that makes no valuable contribution to the market-
place of ideas. Moreover, the approach eliminates the ambiguous,
manipulable fighting words rhetoric traditionally used by courts.
The Supreme Court's future treatment of fighting words is
unpredictable. The R.A.V. Court clearly reinvigorated the fighting
words doctrine, but the exception's scope is unclear from the decision.
By limiting fighting words to purely private, direct, interpersonal
insults, however, the Court could clarify over fifty years of confusion
and create a constitutionally sound fighting words doctrine.
Melody L. Hurdle*
"I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel" and "Bury the
niggers"). Because the line between unprotected personal insults and protected speech may be
hard to distinguish at times, legislatures may tend to overregulate beyond the scope of this
fighting words exception and infringe into areas of protected expression. Nevertheless, if a
legislature carefully draws lines and proscribes only those private, personal insults that do not
impact our organization as a society-those that do not contribute to the marketplace of
ideas-the ordinance could provide a constitutionally sound piece of legislation that lies within a
logical fighting words exclusion.
* The Author would like to express her appreciation to Professor Tom McCoy of Vanderbilt
School of Law for his helpful comments and suggestions during the writing of this Recent
Development.
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